The Impact of the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland on the Dynamics in the Horn of Africa

Translated by Salma Hussein

Reviewed by Mariam Essa

Written by Rehab Amin
Political Researcher

Expectations of a crisis in the Horn of Africa have materialized following Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s speech last October, in which he sought to convey the message that countries in the region must find a solution for Ethiopia regarding access to international waters. He emphasized Ethiopia’s desire to assert its political weight and diplomatic presence on regional and international issues, stressing that Ethiopia must obtain a port by all means, even if this were to require the use of force to secure what he described as its natural and historical right to access the Red Sea. He justified this stance by pointing to Ethiopia’s pressing need for maritime access in light of its growing population, which exceeded 123 million in 2022 according to World Bank statistics. The population is expected to reach around 150 million by the end of the current decade. Consequently, Ethiopia is driven by a genuine need to establish its own maritime presence, as access to a sea corridor serves a range of national and regional interests.

Indeed, Ethiopia has taken concrete steps to advance its aspirations of securing a greater role, adopting strategies to ensure its access to the Red Sea through the Somaliland region. These moves prompt us to reflect on the future of the Horn of Africa in light of the rapid transformations and deepening crises the region continues to face.

Is this a scene of direct conflict or rather a contagion of conflicts spreading across the region and sweeping up everything in its path? Is there a way out amid mounting regional and international tensions, economic crises battering the states of the region, and the presence of fragile governments and vulnerable states unable to sustain themselves?
These questions will be addressed in the following lines.

First: The “Give-and-Take” Strategy as a Driver of Escalating Conflict in the Horn of Africa

At the beginning of 2024, Ethiopia concluded a preliminary agreement with the Somaliland region, under which Somaliland would grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea through a 20-kilometer coastal strip, paving the way for the establishment of a commercial naval base for a period of fifty years. The agreement would allow Ethiopia to conduct commercial operations and build a military base. In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland as an independent sovereign state, arguably the region’s primary strategic gain after decades of seeking international recognition. The deal also reportedly includes Somaliland receiving a 20% stake in Ethiopian Airlines as annual compensation for leasing the coastal area, an airline that generated approximately $6.9 billion in revenue in 2022. This share represents a significant economic opportunity for Somaliland. Moreover, the agreement could serve as a foundation for attracting recognition from other states in the future. These provisions clearly illustrate a “give-and-take” strategy: Ethiopia secures port access in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty.

In addition, the memorandum reportedly contains other key provisions related to social, political, and economic cooperation, though details remain undisclosed, such as the exact location and nature of the coastal area, whether it falls within territorial or economic waters and its relationship to existing commercial port services stipulated in the agreement. Questions also arise regarding compatibility with the 2016 agreement between Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates, which reportedly included provisions against establishing competing ports in the region for 30 years. During the signing ceremony, Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi stated that the port of Berbera would be among the maritime ports open for Ethiopian use.

This step represents a new chapter in the series of complex regional crises that have characterized the Horn of Africa in recent years, particularly amid concerns over escalating political tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia and divisions among regional states regarding the agreement.

Second: The Indication of Timing

The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland emerged under seemingly favorable circumstances on several levels. It was signed only two days after the Addis Ababa Memorandum (MoU) was concluded in Djibouti on December 29, which had been viewed as a breakthrough in negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia. During that meeting, both sides agreed to resume direct talks within 30 days, focus on unresolved core issues and follow up on the implementation of nine prior understandings reached since 2012, including cooperation on security and joint efforts to promote stability, suggesting that tensions were, at least outwardly, moving toward de-escalation.

Additionally, the memorandum came shortly after another agreement signed in Addis Ababa on December 8 between the defense ministers of Somalia and Ethiopia. That agreement aimed to support regional stability, enhance military and defense cooperation, confront shared threats and promote peace and security in the Horn of Africa. It reaffirmed both parties’ commitment to combating terrorism, extremism, piracy and climate change as shared challenges, including the formation of joint committees to oversee implementation. This agreement renewed and expanded upon a broader security agreement signed in 2014.

Furthermore, the timing coincides with rising geopolitical tensions in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden due to repeated Houthi attacks on Israeli- and American-linked vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the context of the Gaza war. These developments have led to a notable increase in global energy prices and prompted 18 major global shipping companies to reroute or suspend navigation through the strait, which accounts for approximately 12% of global trade and sees at least 57 vessels pass daily. Such tensions fluctuate in connection with developments in Gaza and carry significant political and economic repercussions.

Besides, the memorandum was signed at a time when both Ethiopia and Somaliland are experiencing comparable internal political fragility, marked by institutional weaknesses, social fragmentation and secessionist tendencies. In Somaliland, the declaration of the SSC administration in Las Anod in 2023 reflects internal fractures, while in northern Ethiopia, tensions surrounding the Tigray region remain volatile despite the cessation of large-scale hostilities. These dynamics indicate growing socio-economic pressures and the lingering potential for renewed conflict. In this context, Ethiopia appears to have chosen a moment it deemed strategically advantageous to advance its interests of securing influence and presence in the Red Sea, despite the broader implications for regional stability.

Finally, what cannot be overlooked when considering the potential outcomes of the ongoing situation in the region is that there is a deepening crisis that may intensify further, possibly approaching its peak. The region is already facing significant challenges on political, security, and economic fronts, compounded by a rush of international and regional actors pulling in different directions. The direct responsibility falls on the regional institutions concerned to act swiftly to de-escalate the situation and not ignore the brewing tensions to prevent a new war between Ethiopia and Somalia, an outcome both countries are keen to avoid, despite the presence of all the elements that could ignite conflict. The African Union should work diligently to find a way out of this crisis, and the Arab League could also play a role in mediation through its diplomatic channels.

The Article dates back to July 2024.