African Democracy Undermined By The Existence of Terrorist Groups

Translated by Nouran Mohamed
Reviewed by Mohaned Mohammed

Written by Balqees Al-Haidari
Master’s Researcher at the Faculty of African Studies, Cairo University

Perhaps the most prominent political challenge due to terrorism in the Sahel region is undermining democracy within these African states, as the climate of insecurity associated with the presence of terrorist groups in the Sahel contributes to the erosion of democratic processes, leading to the spread and return of authoritarianism in many West African countries.

As a result of terrorist practices, these African states often move one step forward only to retreat two steps backward, in what resembles, to some extent, the march of a crawfish. Among the most vivid examples was the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in Mali in September 2020 following a military coup, after which the army assumed power, only to witness yet another coup led by Colonel Assimi Goïta less than a year later. This was followed by constitutional changes introduced by President Alassane Ouattara in the Ivory Coast, as well as the measures taken by President Alpha Condé in Guinea prior to his own overthrow. Observers note that these amendments were aimed at enabling third presidential terms, which in turn fueled political unrest that came as a surprise, especially at a time when many West African states appeared to be turning the page on authoritarian regimes, amid continued instability across the Sahel and West Africa, following the widespread expansion of armed and extremist movements.

State's Lack of Control Over Large Parts of Its Territory.

The climate of insecurity associated with terrorist groups in the Sahel contributes directly to political instability, now increasingly visible in several Francophone West African states. Among the internal factors explaining this phenomenon was the resignation of former Burkinabe Prime Minister Christophe Dabiré prior to the recent military coup in Burkina Faso. The resignation followed waves of public anger over escalating jihadist violence sweeping the country.

Undoubtedly, the arising threats from terrorist activities significantly affect the economies of Sahel states, draining vast amounts of national resources. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continues to face recurring problems related to insufficient funding. Officials interviewed have indicated that funds are simply unavailable, without specifying clear reasons beyond evident disagreements among member states regarding mechanisms for financing the plan. Instead of contributing to ECOWAS’s, some countries have opted to fund activities in line with their own national counterterrorism initiatives, which do not necessarily align with the broader regional strategy.

Moreover, the Sahel region presents a security dilemma that almost defies conventional security strategies and approaches. Some scholars describe it as an extreme and intertwined security complex, serving as a vital link between the geopolitical components of the African continent. Consequently, its security manifestations do not merely threaten Africa itself but have generated indirect repercussions that affect neighboring Arab states and beyond, particularly Europe. Behind this dilemma stand multiple factors, including unstable political systems, terrorism and violent extremism, external debt burdens, environmental degradation, civil wars, food insecurity, mass displacement, fragile and easily penetrable borders, irregular migration, drug trafficking, etc.

In addition, certain Sahel states, in coordination with ECOWAS, have chosen to directly distribute funds allocated by the West African Economic and Monetary Union among member states. Although Nigeria and Ghana pledged contributions of up to $400 million to the common pool, neither country has made significant payments thus far. This may be attributed to the economic challenges these countries face, particularly the sharp decline in oil prices in Nigeria’s case. However, it may also signal an implicit lack of confidence in ECOWAS as an effective regional counterterrorism mechanism. Compounding these challenges are the questionable objectives and priorities of the action plan itself, notably its ambitious goal of eliminating terrorism within five years. Given that terrorism threatens all fifteen ECOWAS member states and constitutes a major challenge in at least four of them: Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso; such an objective appears highly ambitious. Counterterrorism is a long-term and resource-intensive endeavor requiring sustained investments of time and funding, which partly explains the limited commitment of regional states to fully implementing the ECOWAS plan.

The double mechanisms and initiatives aimed at combating terrorism within the same theater of operation further reflects the absence of a comprehensive framework defining the mission to be pursued, the main axes of intervention and a detailed action plan specifying objectives, tools, resources, timelines and the respective responsibilities of the African Union and regional economic communities. Such an upstream approach would provide greater clarity and coherence to the various measures undertaken, facilitating their coordination and continuous adaptation to both internal constraints, such as institutional weaknesses and external realities observed on the ground.

Structural Motives: Fragility of the Sahel and Sahara Region

Sahelian societies face interconnected economic challenges, recurring crises, and mounting pressures on land, resources, and employment, placing these countries among the most vulnerable globally. Niger, Chad, and Mali have consistently ranked at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index, which measures indicators such as health, education, and living standards. Yet national averages fail to capture the true extent of poverty and destitution in the most at-risk communities, particularly in areas infiltrated by violent extremist groups, which remain among the most marginalized socially and economically. Environmental degradation and climate change have compounded these weaknesses in a region where the vast majority of the population depends on agriculture, pastoralism and livestock for survival. These sectors are heavily linked to climatic and external impacts. Since the 1970s, average annual rainfall has declined sharply and floodplains and seasonal wetlands have diminished or disappeared. Also, Lake Chad has shrunk by approximately 95% over the past half-century.

Rapid population growth further intensifies these pressures, with annual growth rates ranging between 2.9% and 3.9%, and fertility rates are among the highest globally. According to the UN Development Programme, nearly half the population of the Sahel is under the age of fifteen. Therefore, increasing numbers of individuals compete for shrinking stocks of arable land and water, prompting herders to move southward in search of pasture and water and encroaching upon lands traditionally used by settled farmers. In return, farmers expand cultivation into grazing territories. Thus, traditional livelihoods have become increasingly unsustainable, leaving youth facing unemployment and limited income opportunities. It is a reality that enhances the appeal of extremist narratives and conscription within its ranks.

Additionally, the region suffers from visionless governance and limited sustainable development. Political elites often prioritize power dynamics within the capital over comprehensive national development. Chad, Mali, and Niger have experienced prolonged periods of military rule and yet democratic institutions remain fragile. Although elections are held regularly, outcomes are rarely determined by governmental performance or service delivery but rather by patronage networks and ethnic or religious identity politics. Across the region, the gap between rulers and the ruled remains wide; leaders are aware of dissatisfaction and instability, yet their primary response has been regime preservation rather than reform.

Political dynamics have evolved differently across national contexts, yet basic commonalities linger, including the divide between central governments and marginalized peripheries, uncoherent local governance institutions and the corrosive impact of corruption. Prior to its rapid political collapse in 2012, Mali had been praised in Western development circles as a model of democratic progress. However, the country’s apparent stability and regular elections concealed growing public discontent with the ruling elites and structural institutional deficiencies. The concentration of power in southern Mali generated enduring grievances and mistrust in the north. Despite not being the sole schism, it was central to confrontation. State authorities had limited incentives to invest resources in the northern regions, as the country’s lucrative mining industry, its main export revenue source, was concentrated in the south, while the north, home to only 10 percent of the population, offered limited political or economic returns.

Finally, hostility toward political elites in Bamako among nomadic Tuareg communities in the north dates back to the colonial period, materializing in large-scale rebellions in 1962, 1992, and 2012. Following a peace agreement in the 1990s, the Malian government initiated a decentralization process aimed at transferring resources and delegating authority to newly established regional and local institutions. Yet the process was never fully implemented; locally elected officials were often obstructed or sidelined by centrally appointed administrators. Rather than pursuing genuine power transfer, successive governments in Bamako sought to retain resources and govern the north indirectly, relying on patronage networks and administrative appointments to secure loyalty, supporting local militias to exploit ethnic divisions and neutralize rivals. This dynamic ensured complicity with smuggling networks while simultaneously providing lucrative supplementary income streams for governing elites in the capital.